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ARGUMENT 
I. CANYON ROAD TOWERS MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE ENTERED 
INTO A VALID AND ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT WHICH WAS NOT 
ILLEGAL AND NOT UNENFORCEABLE UNDER THE STATUTE OF 
FRAUDS. 
A. The agreement between Canyon Road Towers Management Committee 
and Johannessens contained all the elements of a valid and enforceable 
contract. 
Appellees (hereinafter "Canyon Road Towers") contend that the agreement between 
Canyon Road Towers Management Committee and Appellants (hereinafter "Johannessens") is 
not valid or enforceable upon the grounds that the Management Committee was not a proper 
party and that the agreement lacked sufficient consideration. Generally, in Utah, a valid and 
enforceable contract requires proper parties having mutual consent and consideration. Auqugen 
International Inc., v. Calrae Trust. 972 p.2d 411, 413 (Utah 1998). To determine if parties 
entered into an enforceable contract, a court should consider all preliminary negotiations, offers, 
and counter offers and interpret the various expressions of the parties for the purpose of deciding 
whether the parties reached agreement on the terms. Nunlev v. Westates Casing Services, Inc., 
989 P.2d 1077, 1084 (Utah 1999). In this case, the Management Committee had capacity to 
enter into the subject contract and said contract is supported by valid consideration. 
Canyon Road Towers asserts that the Management Committee were not "proper parties 
with the required capacity" to enter into the subject contract without unit owners vote or consent. 
However, Canyon Road Towers fails to provide any definition of "proper parties with the 
required capacity." Canyon Road Towers does not argue that the Management Committee some 
how lacked sufficient mental capacity to contract in general, but merely argues that the 
Committee lacked sufficient authority to contract as it did. 
1 
The Management Committee had not only the mental capacity to contract, but had the 
express authority to enter into contracts pursuant to the governing documents. (Declaration of 
Condominium If 12; R. at 25-27). Furthermore, the Association's Declaration of Condominium 
states that any person who in good faith and for value relies on a written instrument (in this case 
the association's written minutes and its subsequent dealings) may conclusively rely on the 
power of the management committee to act (See Declaration of Condominium f^ 12(a)(9); R. at 
26). Canyon Road Tower's argument that the Committee was not a proper party, or lacked 
capacity, is merely a reiteration of its argument that the contract is invalid as contrary to the Utah 
Condominium Act. Johannessens disagree with Canyon Road Tower's assertions, and address 
said arguments further herein. 
Canyon Road Tower's assertion that the parties' contract lacked valid consideration is 
also invalid. Generally, to have a valid consideration, each party must be obligated to confer a 
benefit upon the other or suffer a detriment at the other's request. Manwill v. Ovler, 361 P.2d 
177, 178 (Utah 1961). Furthermore, consideration may also be supplied by promissory estoppel. 
Talboe Construction Co. v. Staker Paving & Construction Co., 682 P.2d 843, 845 (Utah 1984). 
In this case, both parties benefited from a bargained for exchange, thus supplying the 
necessary consideration. The consideration upon which the agreement was based includes 
Johannessens' lowered assessment and Canyon Road Towers gaining the benefit of a dues-
paying owner. As a practical matter, the one time that the association faces risk by loss on dues 
is when a first mortgage lender forecloses on a unit. This was in jeopardy of occurring in unit P9 
prior to Johannessens' purchase because the unit was in foreclosure. (Johannessen Aff. R. at 
105, Seely Aff. R. at 252). The association knew that unit P9 was very difficult to market 
because of the abnormally high dues. Id_ They sought a solution by lowering the assessment 
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and subsidizing the dues to solve an ongoing problem. Id. Therefore, each party to the contract 
sustained a benefit therefrom. 
Even if the Management Committee did not receive a sufficient benefit from their 
bargained for exchange, consideration is supplied by promissory estoppel. Generally, 
promissory estoppel provides a substitute for consideration. Stangl v. Ernst Home Center, Inc., 
948 P.2d 356 (Utah App. 1997). The Utah Supreme Court defines promissory estoppel as "a 
promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part 
of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance." Talboe 
Construction Co. v. Staker Paving & Construction Co., 682 P.2d 843, 845 (Utah 1984) (citing 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts 90). In such circumstances, a promise "is binding if injustice 
can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." IcL In Utah four elements are necessary to 
show promissory estoppel: 
(1) The Plaintiff acted with prudence and in reasonable reliance on a promise 
made by the Defendant; (2) the Defendant knew that the plaintiff had relied on the 
promise which the defendant should reasonably expect to induce action or 
forbearance on the party of the plaintiff or a third person; (3) the Defendant was 
aware of all material facts; and (4) the Plaintiff relied on the promise and the 
reliance resulted in a loss to the Plaintiff. 
Nunlev v. Westates Casing Services. 989 P.2d 1077, 1088 (Utah 1999). 
Each of the elements promissory estoppel has been conclusively established herein. 
Canyon Road Towers argues that Johannessens did not act with prudence and in reasonable 
reliance because they had constructive knowledge of the Declaration of Condominium. 
Johannessens herein did act with prudence and in reasonable reliance on Canyon Road Tower's 
promise to lower the assessment on the unit they were purchasing by making such an 
accommodation part of their purchase contract. Johannessens acted reasonably in relying upon 
the promise given that the promise was reflected in both the purchase agreement and the Minutes 
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for December 10, 1992, of the Homeowners Association Board, (Johannessen Aff.;R. at 105-
106, Seely Aff., R. at 252). Johannessens had no reason to question the Committee's ability to 
contract and subsidize their monthly assessment as the governing documents specifically give the 
Committee the power to so contract and establishes conclusively that Johannessens had a right to 
rely upon the Committee's power to so contract. (Declaration of Condominium Tf 12; R. at 25-
27, Transcript P 25-26, R. at 360-361.) Canyon Road Towers certainly knew that Johannessens 
relied upon the promise and that the promise would reasonably induce Johannessens to purchase 
the subject property as the Minutes for December 10, 1992, of the Owners Association's Board 
state specifically that the Board was fully aware that the lowered assessment was a condition of 
Johannessens purchasing the unit. (Johannessen Aff. Ex. B; R. at 109, Seely Aff., R at 253). 
Canyon Road Towers was fully aware of all of the material facts surrounding the agreement and 
it is reasonable that they would expect Johannessens to purchase the unit in reliance upon their 
promise. Id. The reasonableness of Johannessens' reliance is supported by the Declaration of 
Condominium itself, which provides that the management committee's writings conclusively 
establish the association's power to act. (Declaration of Condominium ^ 12(a)(9); R. at 26.) 
Finally, as specifically found by the trial court, Johannessens relied upon the contract to their 
detriment. (Transcript P26, R. at 361.) Johannessens relied upon the promise and purchased the 
unit, only to have the promise taken away long after the purchase. As a result, Johannessens' 
property value is severely diminished through the stigma of an unreasonably high monthly 
assessment and Johannessens will otherwise bear the burden of paying the unreasonably high 
monthly assessment in perpetuity. 
It is undisputed that Canyon Road Towers entered into an agreement with Johannessens 
to lower the assessment on their condominium in connection with Johannessens's purchase of 
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unit P9. Canyon Road Towers merely asserts that the agreement is not enforceable. However, 
Johannessens detrimentally relied upon Canyon Road Tower's agreement to reduce the 
assessment on unit P9 upon Johannessens' purchasing this condominium unit. For this reason, 
under the principal of equity, Canyon Road Towers is estopped from breaching the agreement, or 
arguing that the agreement lacks sufficient consideration, under the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel. 
B. The Agreement between Johannessens and Canyon Road Towers 
Management Committee is not barred by the Statute of Frauds. 
Canyon Road Towers contends that any agreement between Johannessens and the 
Management Committee could not be performed within one year, is not supported by a sufficient 
writing, and is, therefore, void under the statute of frauds. Generally, agreements which may not 
be performed within one year must be in writing to be enforceable. Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4. 
The agreement herein was supported by a writing containing the essential terms of the 
contract sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. Indeed, this agreement is supported by 
numerous writings. The minutes of the management committee are a sufficient writing and are 
signed by the party to be charged. It should be noted that during the management committees' 
deliberations, Johannessens were regularly negotiating the matter with the Committee's then 
President, Glen Seely. (Seely Aff, R. at 251-253). When the committee came back to 
Johannessens with the figure of $416 monthly, in writing, Johannessens were in agreement. 
(Johannessen Aff, R. at 106, Seely Aff, R. at 252). The agreement was that the assessment on 
Unit P9 would be calculated according to the same assessment for the two units directly beneath 
Unit P9, which would have been $546, less one maintenance fee and one reserve fee, as this was 
only one unit. (Seely Aff, R. at 252). Therefore, the agreement is supported by a signed writing 
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containing all the essential terms to support a permanent reduction of the fees on unit P9. 
Subsequent writings have confirmed the existence of a contract. On February 14, 1997, Canyon 
Road Towers sent Johannessens a letter acknowledging that they had previously entered into an 
agreement for Johannessens to pay a reduced fee. (Johannessen Aff, R. at 271). Furthermore, 
the Minutes of the Management Committee Meeting dated September 10, 1996 recognizes that 
the management committee reduced Johannessens fee "as an inducement for them to buy the 
special penthouse unit." Id. at 273. Therefore, sufficient writings exist, signed by Canyon Road 
Towers, to satisfy the Statute of Frauds in this case. 
Even if sufficient writings did not exist, this contract is not subject to the Statute of 
Frauds due to part performance. The Statute of Frauds does not limit the powers of this Court to 
enforce contracts where there has been part performance. Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-8. Generally, 
"an otherwise invalid agreement may be enforced through a court's equitable prerogatives if a 
party, relying on the oral agreement, partially performs its contractual obligations" as part 
performance. Jenkins v. PercivaL 962 P.2d 796, 801 (Utah 1998). The doctrine of part 
performance is meant "to prevent an overly rigid adherence to the statute from becoming the 
means of perpetrating a fraud." Id. 
Johannessens herein relied upon Canyon Road Tower's representations in purchasing 
their unit. (Johannessen Aff., R. at 105, Seely Aff, R. at 253, Johannessen Aff. R. at 273). 
Johannessens further showed their reliance, and partly performed, by continuing to pay the 
agreed-upon assessment for over 4 years, which the Association accepted without complaint. 
Even if the agreement lacks a sufficient writing, Johannessens' part performance takes this 
matter outside the statute of frauds. 
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C. The agreement between Johannessens and the Management Committee is not illegal. 
Canyon Road Towers asserts that the contract which is the subject matter of this suit is 
illegal and void upon the grounds that the Management Committee may not adjust ownership 
percentages among unit owners without the owners' authorization pursuant to the Utah 
Condominium Act. Canyon Road Tower's argument is seriously flawed upon two grounds; (1) 
that the agreement did not seek to adjust ownership percentages, but rather sought a subsidy of 
the assigned association fee, and (2) Canyon Road Towers seeks to interpose a defense based 
upon their ultra vires acts. 
Canyon Road Towers correctly cites Utah law as requiring unanimous consent of the 
homeowners to adjust the ownership percentages. However, Johannessens and Canyon Road 
Towers did not seek to adjust ownership percentages by virtue of their agreement to lower the 
assessment on Unit P9. Rather, Canyon Road Towers agreed to subsidize the unreasonably large 
assessment on that unit to assist in the sale. The declaration and bylaws do not specifically 
restrict the committee's ability to provide such subsidy. Therefore, Canyon Road Towers is 
bound by such contract. Section 12 of the Canyon Road Towers Declaration of Condominium 
grants the Management Committee authority to contract and perform any other acts and to enter 
into any other transactions which may be reasonably necessary for the Management Committee 
to perform its functions as agent of the Unit Owners. (Declaration of Condominium, |^ 12, R. at 
25-27). 
Canyon Road Tower's argument that the committee lacked capacity to contract also fails 
upon the ground that ultra vires is not a proper defense. As provided herein, Canyon Road 
Towers may not now invalidate the previous agreement by claiming it was an ultra vires act. (See 
Section III at page 9 for expanded discussion.) 
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II. JOHANNESSENS ARE NOT ESTOPPED FROM ARGUING THE 
EXISTENCE OF AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES BY THE 
THEORY OF ESTOPPEL BY DEED. 
Canyon Road Towers asserts that Johannessens are estopped from claiming their 
condominium unit is subject to a lower assessment than propounded in the Declaration of 
Condominium, as their deed referred directly to the Declaration. Canyon Road Towers supports 
this theory by the doctrine of estoppel by deed. Generally, an estoppel by deed prevents a party 
from enjoying the benefits of a deed while at the same time rejecting the burdens. 28 Am. Jur. 
2d Estoppel and Waiver §13. However, "Strictly speaking, estoppel by deed does not ordinarily 
apply to the grantee." Id. Estoppel by deed is "generally limited to an action on the deed itself; 
in a collateral action, there is ordinarily no estoppel." Id. At §4. 
Canyon Road Towers cite Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224 (Utah 1983), as support for 
their position on estoppel by deed. However, the Hall decision is not based upon the doctrine of 
estoppel by deed and merely mentions the theory in dicta. Id. at 228. 
Estoppel by deed is inapplicable to Johannessens herein. First, Johannessens are not 
suing upon the deed itself, rather Canyon Road Towers are suing upon a collateral contract to the 
real estate transaction. Second, estoppel by deed requires that Johannessens be claiming some 
benefit under the deed and simultaneously reject the burden of the deed. Johannessens herein 
have asserted no benefit of the deed in this action, but have only rejected a particular burden that 
Canyon Road Towers agreed to subsidize. Consequently, the theory of estoppel by deed is 
inapplicable to Johannessens in this case. 
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III. CANYON ROAD TOWERS MAY NOT NOW AVOID THEIR PRIOR ACTS 
UPON THE GROUNDS THAT SAID ACTS ARE ULTRA VIRES. 
Canyon Road Towers argues that the Board had no power to lower the dues, absent 
compliance with the Utah Condominium Act. When a corporation acts without any capacity, 
power, or authorization to complete the act, the act is termed ultra vires. However, no act of a 
non-profit corporation is invalid solely because it is ultra vires. Utah Code Ann. §16-6-23. Utah 
Code Ann. §16-6-23 provides: 
No act of nonprofit corporation and no conveyance or transfer of 
real or personal property to or by such a corporation shall be 
invalid by reason of the fact that the corporation was without 
capacity or power to do such act or to make or receive such 
conveyance or transfer . . . 
Generally, this statute has been interpreted to limit the ultra vires defense and to lend 
credence to agreements where parties contracted with the corporation in good faith without 
knowledge of the corporate authorization. Park v. Aha Ditch & Canal Co., 458 P.2d 625, 628 
(Utah 1969). Reedeker v. Salisbury, 952 P.2d 577, 588 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) ("the primary 
purpose of section 16-6-23, as evidenced by the section's plain language, is to eliminate a 
corporation's ability to avoid its obligations to third parties by raising a defense of ultra vires"). 
Canyon Road Towers further asserts that it is absurd to claim that a corporation could 
enter into an agreement contrary to Utah Code Ann. § 57-8-7 and have the "illegal" contract 
enforced by virtue of Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-23, which limits Ultra Vires defenses. But is it not 
also absurd to assert that a corporation may assert an Ultra Vires defense in such a case despite 
Utah Code Ann. §16-6-23? To concede Canyon Road Towers argument that their contract, 
which they do not deny entering into, is unenforceable as being "illegal" would give absolutely 
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no meaning or force to Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-23 which limits the Ultra Vires defense. It is 
doubtful that the legislature enacted said statute with the intent that it would have no force, 
meaning, or effect. 
Johannessens contracted with Canyon Road Towers Corporation in good faith, believing 
that it had authority to lower the assessment on their unit. Regardless of whether Canyon Road 
Towers Corporation had said authority, they may not now avoid their contractual responsibility 
merely because the entity lacked corporate authority to so contract. Canyon Road Tower's 
assertion that the contract should not be upheld because it is illegal is misplaced. Regardless of 
the Condominium Ownership Act, there is nothing prohibiting Canyon Road Towers from 
entering into a contract to subsidize a particular unit. Because Utah Code Ann. 16-6-23 limits 
the ultra vires defense, Canyon Road Towers is bound by their agreement even if the corporation 
lacked authority to contract to lower the assessment. 
IV. THE AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID JOHANNESSEN IS SUPPORTED BY 
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE, IS NOT CONCLUSORY, IS NOT ARGUMENTATIVE 
AND DOES NOT MAKE INNAPPROPRIATE LEGAL CONCLUSIONS. 
Canyon Road Towers asserts that various paragraphs of the affidavit of David 
Johannessen, submitted in support of summary judgment, failed to comply with the requirements 
of Rule 56(e), in that the affidavit was not made on personal knowledge, was not supported by 
proper foundation, was argumentative, and/or made legal conclusions. Johannessens deny that 
the affidavit was deficient in any material respect. 
Canyon Road Towers objects to paragraph 11 of the Affidavit of David Johannessen 
claiming that it is not based upon personal knowledge. Specifically, Canyon Road Towers 
claims that Mr. Johannessen could not testify that an agreement was reached because he was not 
at the meeting of the management committee. To the contrary, Mr. Johannessen received copies 
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of the minutes of said meeting and the agreement to lower the assessment was communicated to 
him shortly thereafter. (Johannessen Aff, R. at 105-106, Seely Aff, R. at 252) Indeed, through 
hours of negotiations with the Board for purchase of unit P9, Johannessens became intimately 
aware of the Board's opinions regarding the unit. Id. These negotiations served to provide 
Johannessens with sufficient grounds upon which to base his statements in paragraph 11 of his 
affidavit. Mr. Johannessen certainly did have personal knowledge of those facts and is testifying 
concerning his knowledge of the transaction. 
Canyon Road Towers objects to paragraphs 13 and 14 upon the grounds that they are 
argumentative and conclusory. In paragraph 13, Mr. Johannessen seeks to simply convey to the 
court that subsequent to his purchase, the billings for dues remained the same for a significant 
period of time. (Johannessen Aff, R. at 107). Obviously, the Court can form a legal conclusion 
concerning the effect of said billings. Likewise, in paragraph 14, Mr. Johannessen simply seeks 
to convey to the court that the management committee has since sought to rescind or discontinue 
the prior lowered assessment, which Canyon Road Towers does not dispute. Id Again, the 
Court can assess the legal consequences of the management committee's actions. 
Canyon Road Towers argues that Mr. Johannessen lacks personal knowledge concerning 
the allegations of paragraph 16. Mr. Johannessen has resided in his Canyon Road Towers 
condominium since 1992. (Johannessen Aff, R. at 106, Seely Aff., R. at 251). Although not a 
member of the management committee, Mr. Johannessen has been reasonably active in the 
homeowners association and is generally aware of the committee's actions pertinent to the 
building. (Johannessen Aff, R. at 107). In paragraph 16, Mr. Johannessen merely states his 
understanding of certain transactions entered into by the committee. Id. 
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As demonstrated, the omitted portions of Johannessens's affidavit were based on personal 
knowledge, did not make legal conclusions, and maintained appropriate foundation under Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure 56(e). As a result, Johannessens's Affidavit in Support of Summary 
Judgment should be admissible in its entirety. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the trial court's holding should be reversed and the case 
remanded to determine damages. 
DATED this if/day of Um^.A^. .2001. 
J. Gallian 
Jf and for 
GALLIAN, WESTFALL, WILCOX & WELKER 
Attorney for Johannessens 
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